If you ever look up Russia’s national debt, the first number you see makes the war in Ukraine look strangely affordable. Government debt is sitting around 18 to 20 percent of the country’s annual economic output (GDP), heading toward about 22 percent next year. Compare that to the United States, France, or Japan, all of which carry debt well over 100 percent of GDP, and it is easy to wonder why anyone thinks Russia has a debt problem at all.
The comparison breaks down for the same reason personal debt does. Carrying a $500,000 mortgage at 3 percent from a dozen competing banks is a completely different life from carrying a $100,000 credit-card balance at 17 percent when nobody else in town will lend to you. Rich Western governments borrow cheaply from investors all over the world. Since Western sanctions cut Russia off from global financial markets in 2022, Moscow can basically only borrow in rubles from its own domestic banks, and those banks are now charging credit-card interest rates.
Two things happened in Moscow on November 19, 2026 that show how tight that squeeze has gotten. Russia’s parliament (the State Duma) approved the next three years of federal budgets in its main working vote, pushing military spending to its highest share since the Soviet Union while cutting civilian programs. On that exact same day, the interest rate on Russian government bonds hit its highest long-term level since the central bank started keeping records in 2003: 17 percent on a 10-year loan, climbing to 17.3 percent on a 30-year loan.
To understand how a country with massive oil reserves and tiny pre-war debt ended up paying 17 percent interest, it helps to trace the money from the front line back to the banks. (Dollar figures below use late-2026 exchange rates of roughly 82 rubles to the dollar.)
The starting point is a political choice. On state television and in the federal budget, the Kremlin treats the war in Ukraine as a fight for national survival. Yet there is one thing countries fighting for survival normally do that Vladimir Putin has worked very hard to avoid: a broad military draft.
In September 2022, about seven months into the invasion, the Kremlin ordered a “partial mobilization” to call up roughly 300,000 reservists. It was the biggest domestic political shock of the war. Hundreds of thousands of working-age men fled across the borders to Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Armenia, and for the first time the fighting stopped feeling like something happening far away on TV. Ever since, the Kremlin’s quiet deal with ordinary Russians, especially the urban middle class in Moscow and St. Petersburg, has been simple: stay out of politics, and we won’t grab your sons off the street.
The catch is that armies still need people, and Ukraine has been chewing through Russian troops for nearly four years. If you won’t draft soldiers, you have to hire them. Because Russia already has a severe worker shortage (hundreds of thousands of men are at the front, others left the country, and weapons factories are running round the clock), convincing roughly a thousand volunteers a day to sign an army contract takes an astonishing amount of cash.
According to regional budget records tracked by economist Janis Kluge, Russia signed about 234,000 new military contracts in the first eight months of 2026, roughly 20 percent fewer than in the same stretch of 2025 even though payouts kept rising. By September 2026, the average sign-up bonus paid by regional governments alone had climbed past 2.3 million rubles (about $28,000, in a country where average annual wages are well under half that), with some regions offering 3.4 million rubles ($41,000), on top of federal signing bonuses and federal death payouts to families exceeding 10 million rubles ($122,000).
Local governments are already scrambling to scrape that cash together. The region of Sakha postponed inflation raises for public-sector workers because of unplanned contract-soldier payouts. Volgograd cancelled a city youth festival the same week it raised its recruitment bonus to 3.4 million rubles ($41,000). Several regions, including Bashkortostan, Kirov, Omsk, Ulyanovsk, and Orenburg, sharply cut or eliminated their own local death payouts to grieving families so they could funnel scarce cash into upfront recruitment bonuses instead. Avoiding a draft keeps the political peace in Moscow, at the cost of turning the army into a giant, inflating payroll.
All of that shows up straight inside the federal budget approved for 2027. Total federal spending is set at 48.74 trillion rubles ($594 billion) against 43.30 trillion ($528 billion) in planned revenue, leaving a gap (deficit) of 5.44 trillion rubles ($66 billion), with similar 5-trillion-plus ($61 billion) deficits penciled in for 2028 and 2029. And Russian wartime budgets have consistently lowballed reality: the 2026 budget was originally written with a 3.79 trillion ruble ($46 billion) deficit, then overshot spending by roughly 4.5 trillion ($55 billion), forcing the Finance Ministry to nearly double its 2026 deficit estimate to 7.35 trillion rubles ($90 billion). Analysts at the KSE Institute think the final 2026 tally could top 8 trillion rubles ($98 billion).
You can watch the whole state warp around that bill over the last six years. Before the invasion, Russia spent about 24.8 trillion rubles a year in total ($302 billion at today’s exchange rate, or roughly $335 billion at 2021 rates), with 3.57 trillion ($44 billion) going to the military and 1.08 trillion ($13 billion) to debt interest. In the 2027 draft, total federal spending has nearly doubled to 48.74 trillion rubles ($594 billion), yet civilian spending is actually smaller in rubles than it was in 2024. Nearly all of the growth has gone to three buckets: direct military spending jumps to 17.15 trillion rubles ($209 billion, or 35 percent of the federal budget), police and internal security take 4.29 trillion ($52 billion, bringing military plus security to 44 percent even before classified war spending tucked inside civilian agencies), and interest on government debt takes another 4.57 trillion ($56 billion, or 9.4 percent). More than half of every federal ruble is spoken for before paying for pensions, hospitals, schools, or heating pipes. Against the original 2026 budget law, federal social spending drops 15 percent on paper, housing and utilities drop almost 10 percent, and healthcare drops nearly 5 percent. With inflation still near 7 percent, those are even steeper cuts in what the money actually buys.
How government bonds work, and why Moscow is paying 17 percent
For the first couple of years of the war, Russia could afford to spend like this without feeling much immediate pain because it had two big financial cushions: oil exports and a giant rainy-day savings account called the National Wealth Fund.
Both cushions have worn thin. Before the war, oil and gas taxes supplied more than 40 percent of Russia’s federal budget (46 percent in 2018, and still 42 percent in 2022 when energy prices spiked). By the first nine months of 2026, oil and gas had shrunk to 18.5 percent of federal revenue, and the 2027 budget only counts on 7 trillion rubles ($85 billion), or 16.2 percent. Even when conflict in the Middle East pushed world oil prices higher in 2026, Moscow barely benefited: it had to sell crude at steep discounts to buyers in Asia, pay hefty subsidies to keep domestic fuel prices from exploding, and deal with Ukrainian long-range drone strikes knocking out Russian refineries and fuel depots. Through October 2026, Russian oil and gas tax revenue was still down 14 percent from the year before.
The rainy-day fund is in similar shape. When the invasion started, the National Wealth Fund held spendable savings equal to 6.5 percent of Russia’s GDP. By mid-2026, those liquid reserves had dropped 59 percent, down to about 4 trillion rubles ($49 billion, or 1.8 percent of GDP). All of its Western currency has been spent, leaving only Chinese yuan and 131.5 tonnes of gold (whose value mostly looks respectable because gold prices surged in 2024 and 2025). The rest of the fund’s headline 13.2 trillion ruble ($161 billion) balance is tied up in things the government cannot easily turn into cash, like long-term corporate loans and the state’s 50-percent-plus-one-share controlling stake in Sberbank, Russia’s biggest bank. Tellingly, the 2027-2029 budget stops planning to use the rainy-day fund to cover deficits altogether.
With oil down and savings low, the Kremlin has been squeezing domestic taxes wherever it can: hiking the national sales tax (VAT) to 22 percent in January 2026, taxing interest earned on ordinary bank savings accounts, turning car “recycling fees” into a 1.78 trillion ruble ($22 billion) consumption tax, and collecting extra levies from profitable companies. Even all of that doesn’t close a 5 to 8 trillion ruble ($61 to $98 billion) hole every year.
When a government spends more than it collects in taxes and has burned through its savings, it borrows the difference by selling bonds. A government bond (in the US these are Treasury bonds; in Russia they are called OFZs) is just a standardized IOU with three terms on it: the amount the government promises to pay back at the end (the face value), the number of years until that repayment is due (the maturity, anywhere from 3 months to 30 years), and the regular annual interest payment it pays along the way (the coupon). Every week, the Finance Ministry holds an auction to sell fresh batches of these IOUs.
Here is the part that trips people up if they don’t follow finance: buyers at an auction don’t have to pay full face value. Suppose Russia prints a bond promising to pay back 1,000 rubles in 2033, with a fixed annual payment of 120 rubles (12 percent). If lenders are nervous about inflation and refuse to lend at 12 percent, they simply bid less, say 856 rubles (about 85 cents on the ruble, which is roughly what happened at a real Russian auction in October 2026). The government still owes the full 1,000 rubles in 2033 plus the annual payments, so the lender’s true annual return (the yield) jumps from 12 percent to nearly 17 percent. The less buyers trust the currency or want the bonds, the bigger discount they demand, and the higher the government’s real interest rate climbs.
Since early 2025, about 85 percent of Russia’s federal deficit has been covered by selling these OFZ bonds, with planned gross sales climbing to 7.7 trillion rubles ($94 billion) in 2027. And because the borrowing is huge and the interest rates are steep, the interest bill is eating a rapidly growing slice of the tax base. According to the Growford Institute, debt interest jumped from 3.8 percent of federal tax revenue before the war to 9.1 percent in 2026. In rubles, federal interest payments have grown nearly sixfold since 2020, from 784 billion rubles ($10 billion) a year to 4.57 trillion ($56 billion) budgeted for 2027.
To see why lenders are demanding 17 percent, it helps to separate two interest rates that get mashed together in the news. A central bank (the Federal Reserve in the US, or the Bank of Russia in Moscow) only directly sets the short-term interest rate that commercial banks pay to borrow overnight or for a few weeks. It raises that rate to cool off inflation and cuts it when prices calm down. Long-term bond rates (for 10-year or 30-year loans) are set by what lenders actually demand at auction, based on what they think inflation and government borrowing will look like years from now.
Normally, lending for 30 years carries a higher interest rate than lending for 1 year, because a lot more can go wrong over three decades. Look at what happened to that relationship in Russia between 2020, 2024, and November 2026:
In late 2020, before the war, Russia’s curve looked totally ordinary: 4.3 percent on short loans, rising smoothly to 7.0 percent on 30-year bonds. In late 2024, when the war economy overheated and Russia’s central bank jacked its short-term rate up to 21 percent, the curve flipped upside down: 1-year bonds paid over 21 percent, while 30-year bonds only paid 14 percent. Lenders were basically betting that 21 percent was a temporary emergency and rates would cool back down.
By late 2026, the central bank had actually lowered its short-term rate down to 14 percent, though it had to pause in October after Ukrainian refinery strikes sent Russian petrol prices up 21 percent and utility hikes nudged inflation back above 7 percent. Normally, long-term bond rates fall alongside the central bank’s rate. Instead, they climbed straight past it. On November 19, 2026, 10-year and 30-year bonds crossed 17 percent, more than three full percentage points above the central bank’s 14 percent rate. Lenders are looking at 7.7 trillion rubles ($94 billion) of fresh bonds coming to market next year, looking at a government still claiming inflation will magically drop to 4 percent, and calling bluff.
And because sanctions drove foreign investors out (foreign ownership of Russian government bonds dropped from 19 percent in early 2022 to 3.1 percent in 2026) and regular Russian households only buy tiny amounts, the Finance Ministry is stuck selling trillions of rubles of IOUs inside a small room of domestic banks that already hold more than 60 percent of the market.
That leads to the catch that makes the next five years so painful even if the fighting stops. Governments almost never pay off their national debt out of pocket. When an old 5-year or 10-year bond reaches its due date (matures), the government usually pays off the old lender by selling a brand-new bond to someone else. In finance, that is called rolling over (or refinancing) the debt.
About 70 percent of Russia’s domestic government debt consists of fixed-rate bonds, roughly 20.8 trillion rubles ($254 billion) as of mid-2026. About half of that pile, roughly 10 trillion rubles ($122 billion), was borrowed before or early in the war at cheap interest rates between 5.7 and 8.5 percent. Think of it like a homeowner sitting on a stack of old 6 percent mortgages that all come due between 2026 and 2031. More than half of that cheap pre-war debt expires over the next five years.
If Russia were running budget surpluses, it could pay those old bonds off and walk away. Because it is running 5 to 8 trillion ruble deficits instead, every time an old 6.5 percent bond comes due, the Finance Ministry has to issue a brand-new bond at 16 or 17 percent just to pay back the old principal. Even if a ceasefire were signed tomorrow and Moscow stopped borrowing a single extra ruble, just refinancing its expiring pre-war debt onto today’s interest rates will keep pushing its annual interest bill higher well into the 2030s.
The bank loop, the hidden war loans, and how long it can last
When almost all of your bond buyers are domestic banks funded by ordinary people’s deposits, you eventually run into a limit on how many government IOUs they can swallow. Moscow hit that limit in the summer of 2026. Demand dried up so badly that the Finance Ministry cancelled bond auctions in June and July, rejected all bids in mid-July, and shut down auctions completely for six weeks, the first freeze since the panic of 2022.
How they got auctions moving again on September 2 says a lot about how the system works now. That day, the government sold a massive 1 trillion ruble ($12.2 billion) bond in a single afternoon, at a 7.5 percent discount that brought in 939 billion rubles ($11.5 billion) in cash. On that exact same day, Russian banks borrowed almost the exact same amount, about 940 billion rubles ($11.5 billion), in short-term loans from the Bank of Russia, pledging nearly the entire batch of newly bought government bonds right back to the central bank as collateral (in banking terms, a repo, basically pawning a bond to the central bank for cash for a week at a time).
Strip away the banking terminology and look at the circle: the central bank creates cash and lends it to commercial banks, the banks hand that cash to the government for bonds, and the banks park those brand-new bonds right back at the central bank. It keeps bond auctions from failing publicly, at the cost of quietly expanding the money supply and feeding the exact inflation that keeps bond rates stuck near 17 percent.
That circular pressure is starting to show up across the banking system. In May 2025, Russian banks were sitting on 1.6 trillion rubles ($20 billion) of spare cash; by September 2026, they were running a 3 trillion ruble ($37 billion) cash shortfall, leaning on 7.4 trillion rubles ($90 billion) of weekly central bank loans (nearly triple a year earlier) just to keep cash moving. At the same time, the government is still draining capital out of the banks to help pay the federal budget: state-controlled Sberbank paid out a record 850 billion ruble ($10.4 billion) dividend in 2026, sending half of it straight into the treasury.
Meanwhile, the official government budget doesn’t even capture all of the war debt. As the Kiel Institute documented in June 2026, Moscow has pushed a huge slice of war spending off the government’s books by pressuring Russian banks to hand out cheap loans directly to defense factories and military contractors. Total Russian corporate debt has jumped by 34 trillion rubles ($415 billion) since 2022, roughly twice as much as all the federal budget deficits combined. On the central bank’s own figures, 11.5 trillion rubles ($140 billion, or nearly 12 percent of all corporate loans) are already flagged as troubled, with about half of that lacking proper reserves or solid collateral. Bank balance sheets only look calm on paper because regulators suspended normal accounting rules for defense borrowers, letting banks avoid booking losses. Even with those rules relaxed, VTB (Russia’s second-largest bank) has said it needs 1.7 trillion rubles ($21 billion) in fresh capital over the next five years, and the state defense bank PSB has nearly doubled its capital base since mid-2024.
Does any of this mean Russia goes broke next month and has to pull its army out of Ukraine? Almost certainly not. People have been predicting an imminent Russian financial collapse every six months since 2022, and those predictions keep missing because a country that borrows in its own currency from banks it controls doesn’t suddenly bounce a check the way a household does, or the way Greece did on the euro. Analysts at the Growford Institute don’t see an immediate banking crash and reckon Moscow can keep fighting at its current pace for at least two more years if oil stays around $60 to $80 a barrel and China keeps supplying industrial parts. The KSE Institute’s stricter modeling estimates that conventional, market-based borrowing and remaining cash buffers run thin by early 2028 (or mid-2027 if bond auctions stall out again). Even then, an authoritarian state still has uglier options: another round of tax hikes, deeper cuts to local roads and clinics, ordering banks and pension funds to buy government bonds whether they want to or not, or printing the money openly and letting inflation eat people’s savings.
Still, there is an old piece of Russian history that puts 17 percent interest into perspective. In 1906, after Imperial Russia lost its war against Japan, the Tsar’s finance minister had to go hat in hand to bankers in Paris and London for an emergency loan just to bring the army home from the Far East and keep the ruble from collapsing. That loan carried a 5 percent interest rate (a little over 5.5 percent once discounts and bankers’ fees were baked in), and even those terms sparked a political scandal that hung over Tsarist finances until World War I. Today the Russian state is paying more than triple that rate at home, not to pay off a war that has ended, just to keep a grinding stalemate moving while avoiding a draft in Moscow and St. Petersburg. You can always print more rubles to keep the bond auctions clearing, and you can delay the day of reckoning for years. You just can’t print the workers you won’t draft, or undo the math of rolling cheap pre-war debt into 17 percent loans that the country will be paying off well into the 2030s.
Sources
- 2027-2029 federal budget and spending breakdown: Meduza (Nov 19, 2026), bne IntelliNews (Nov 19, 2026), and bne IntelliNews / The Bell breakdown (Oct 30, 2026).
- Historical federal budget figures (2019-2026): Gaidar Institute, Monitoring of Russia’s Economic Outlook No. 4(148) (March 2022 PDF), and Julian Cooper / SIPRI, A Budget for a Fifth Year of War (March 2026).
- Rainy-day fund depletion, bank liquidity, and 2027-2028 runway: KSE Institute, Assessing Russia’s War-Financing Capacity (September 2026 PDF) and bne IntelliNews summary.
- Interest payments as a share of tax revenue (Growford Institute): bne IntelliNews (Oct 1, 2026).
- Government bond yields, auction freezes, and central bank rates: Bank of Russia zero-coupon yield curve database, Reuters on the Oct 23, 2026 rate hold, and Ruslan Averin (Oct 12, 2026).
- Off-budget corporate war debt: Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Endgame: The State of the Russian Economy (Kiel Report No. 9, June 2026).
- Contract soldier recruitment bonuses and regional cuts: Janis Kluge, Russianomics (September 2026).
- Bluesky threads: Sam (@abeardedpanda.bsky.social), MAKS 26 (@maks23.bsky.social), Sven-Erik Volberg (@volberg.bsky.social), Janis Kluge (@jakluge.de), and Prune60 (@prune602.bsky.social).
Cover: Vasily Vereshchagin, The Apotheosis of War, 1871. Public domain, source.